










FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: 
GERMAN STATES AS A MICROCOSM 





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1981 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: 
GERMAN STATES AS A MICROCOSM 





Cross-country evidence on student achievement might be hampered by omitted country 
characteristics such as language or legal differences. This paper uses cross-state variation in 
Germany, whose sixteen states share the same language and legal system, but pursue different 
education policies. The same results found previously across countries hold within Germany: 
Higher mean student performance is associated with central exams, private school operation, 
and socio-economic background, but not with spending, while higher equality of opportunity 
is associated with reduced tracking. In a model that pools German states with OECD 
countries, these fundamental determinants do not differ significantly between the two 
samples. 
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1. Introduction   
Cross-country evidence using international student achievement tests shows that institutional 
structures of school systems are important for the efficiency and equity of educational outcomes. 
In terms of efficiency, the main patterns of results suggest that students perform better in 
countries with external exit exams, school autonomy in process and personnel decisions, and 
publicly funded but privately operated schools.
1 While student performance is also strongly 
associated with students’ socio-economic background, there is not much evidence of significant 
associations with schools’ resource endowments. In terms of equity, the extent to which students’ 
outcomes depend on their family background tends to be lower in countries with less intensive 
tracking, more extensive early childhood education, and publicly funded private operation.
2  
The virtue of the cross-country evidence is that it allows for an analysis of variation in 
institutional features which usually do not vary within countries. A key shortcoming, as with any 
international evidence, is that one can never be fully sure whether the observed features are 
exogenous to other country characteristics, i.e. whether some unobserved country heterogeneity 
remains. In an attempt to avoid bias from omitted variables, the literature has reverted to 
extensive sets of control variables for student, school, and country background. Specific studies 
have also made use of specifications with regional (continental) fixed effects in the estimation of 
effects of central exams (Wößmann 2003b) and of differences-in-differences specifications 
across grades in the estimation of effects of early tracking (Hanushek and Wößmann 2006).  
This paper presents another solution to the problem of unobserved country heterogeneity. It 
analyzes variation within a country that has different school systems, namely Germany, where – 
due to the federal structure – the 16 states (Bundesländer) have essentially sole responsibility for 
education policy. The advantage of this approach is that the German systems provide variation in 
institutional features of the school system within the same country, same language, same legal 
system, same general culture, and the like.
3 On the other hand, a key drawback of the approach is 
that the number of relevant observations is only 16, leaving limited degrees of freedom and thus 
small variation to identify from. In addition, German confidentiality requirements preclude the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bishop (1997), Wößmann (2002, 2003a, 2003b), and Fuchs and Wößmann (2007). Wößmann 
(2007a, 2007b) reviews the international evidence on effects of institutions and resources on student performance.  
2 See Hanushek and Wößmann (2006), Schütz et al. (2005), and Ammermüller (2005).  
3 Note that apart from education policy, there is hardly any substantive policy area in which sole responsibility 
remains at the level of states in Germany.    2
informative use of student-level data,
4 so that this paper uses data at the state level only.
5 Despite 
the limited statistical power due to the small number of observations, the state sample should still 
allow for an identification of effects that are of first-order magnitude. At the same time, second-
order effects may be hard to identify with substantial statistical confidence. However, by pooling 
German states with aggregate countries, we can test for differences in results between within-
German and international country variation in a sample of up to 54 observations.  
The German states differ dramatically in the efficiency and equity of schooling outcomes. 
When merging the 16 German states into one league table with the other 28 OECD countries that 
report PISA 2003 performance data, Bavaria (the second largest state in terms of students) takes 
5
th place internationally (test score 533), while North Rhine-Westphalia (the largest state) takes 
35
th place (486) and the city-state of Bremen 39
th place (471) out of the 44 countries and states 
(Prenzel et al. 2005, p. 60). Similarly, in terms of the slope of the socio-economic gradients that 
describe the extent to which students’ test scores depend on their socio-economic background, 
the state of Brandenburg is the 10
th most equal unit (slope 37.5), while the state of Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania takes 40
th place (48.3) (Prenzel et al. 2005, p. 254; OECD 2004, p. 397).  
The state-level nature of German education policy also provides for substantive institutional 
variation between German states. This is particularly true for central exit exams and tracking. In 
2003, seven of the 16 states had external exit exams at the end of secondary school, while the 
other nine states had only exams devised, conducted, and graded by individual teachers. While 
most states tracked their students into different-ability schools after fourth grade (age ten), there 
are two states that conduct the tracking two grades later (age twelve). This does not bring them 
close to the OECD median of first tracking at age fifteen (cf. OECD 2004, p. 262), but it might 
still have an effect on student outcomes. Furthermore, the number of school types and thus the 
extent of tracking range from two to four types. There also is noteworthy variation in expenditure 
per student, the share of private schools, and facilities for early childhood education. By contrast, 
German states are rather uniform in allowing relatively little autonomy for their schools.  
                                                 
4 At the time of writing, student-level data of the PISA-E 2003 test have not yet been released. Some student-
level data of the PISA-E 2000 test have been released, but due to apparent confidentiality requirements, this dataset 
does not include state identifiers, school identifiers, and most of the relevant background variables. As a result, there 
is no way to perform analyses of German cross-state variation in educational outcomes using student-level data. 
5 Of course, the use of student-level data would not change the fact that the number of observations on school 
policies is only 16; it would only allow for more extensive controlling for individual student and school factors.   3
Economic theory suggests that these kinds of institutional frameworks of school systems 
may be fundamental determinants of the efficiency and equity of learning outcomes.
6 Because 
institutions frame the incentives that are at play in the school system – the explicit and implicit 
rewards for teaching and learning, as well as the consequences of poor teaching and learning – 
they will determine the behavior of students, parents, teachers, schools, and administrators.  
The public discussion on the merits of the different institutional features is very intensive in 
Germany. However, it tends to be rather ideological, and if data are referred to at all, it tends to 
be in the form of univariate comparisons of two select states. For example, casual panelists would 
do away the cross-country evidence on detrimental effects of early tracking on equality of 
opportunity by stating that Bavaria (the most equal early tracker) achieves more equality than 
Berlin (one of the two states with delayed tracking). No-one seems to have analyzed the 
associations between the different institutional factors and the substantial variation in efficiency 
and equity of school outcomes across the 16 states in a multivariate and systematic way.  
Given this dearth of analysis, the results reported in this paper constitute a significant 
advancement of our understanding of the associations between institutions and outcomes in the 
school system. At the same time, they should be interpreted cautiously as controlled descriptive 
associations. Even if biases from unobserved country heterogeneity can be ruled out in the 
within-German variation, an interpretation as causal effects might still be hampered by other 
forms of endogeneity, and the limited degrees of freedom preclude deeper analyses.  
The main finding of the paper is that the German state-level analysis strongly confirms the 
cross-country evidence on the importance of institutional conditions for educational outcomes. 
External exit exams are systematically associated with higher student performance in math, 
science, and reading.
7 Delayed tracking and fewer school tracks are significantly related to higher 
equality of opportunity, in the sense that students’ performance depends less strongly on their 
socio-economic background. The enrollment share in privately operated schools is associated 
with higher reading performance, as well as with higher equality of opportunity. While the socio-
economic background is also strongly associated with the efficiency and equity of educational 
outcomes, expenditure per student and class size are not. As in the cross-country evidence, there 
are no signs of efficiency-equity tradeoffs. When we pool the German states with OECD 
                                                 
6 For theoretical models of the effects of different institutions, see Bishop and Wößmann (2004) and Bishop 
(2006) for effects on educational efficiency and section 3 of Schütz et al. (2005) for effects on educational equity. 
7 In this paper, results are reported only for math; results for science and reading are available from the author.    4
countries in a joint analysis to test for consistency between German and international variation, 
all institutional effects are also significant across OECD countries, with the exception of private 
school operation in the equity model. Even more, the size of the effects is statistically 
indistinguishable between the German state sample and the OECD country sample. The fact that 
the German results are strongly in line with the international evidence lends support to the 
conclusion that the existing cross-country evidence may not be substantially biased after all.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 
discusses the empirical models. Sections 4 and 5 present the results on the efficiency and equity 
of educational production across German states, respectively. Section 6 reports results of models 
pooling German states with OECD countries. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Schooling Data across German States 
German state data on student performance are provided by a national extension (PISA-E) of 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development in 2003 (cf. OECD 2004 for details). PISA tested 
representative samples of 15-year-old students in math, science, and reading literacy, with a focus 
of test items on real-life applications. PISA-E used the same tests as the international PISA, but 
additional testing ensured representative sampling within each of the 16 German states. PISA-E 
tested a total of 44,580 students in 1,487 schools, with state samples ranging from 1,618 students 
in Saxony-Anhalt to 4,904 students in Hamburg (cf. Prenzel et al. 2005 for details).  
German states’ mean performance is reported in the official PISA-E publication (Prenzel et 
al. 2005), measured on a scale with mean 500 and standard deviation 100 across all OECD 
countries. Because PISA 2003 had a special focus on math (taking over half of the assessment 
time), this paper focuses on math achievement.
8 On average, the math performance of German 
students is close to the OECD average, at mean 503 and standard deviation 103.  
Prenzel et al. (2005) also report slopes of socio-economic gradients for each state. This is the 
first time ever that such information has been released for German states. The gradients are 
obtained by regressing students’ math performance on their socio-economic background (cf. 
chapter 4 of OECD 2004). Socio-economic background is measured by the PISA index of 
economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS), which uses principal component analysis to 
                                                 
8 In terms of effects on mean performance, the main qualitative results presented for math in this paper hold in 
the same way for science and reading. Socio-economic gradients are not available for science and reading.   5
combine measures of occupational status, education, and wealth (proxied by availability of 
relevant household items). Thus, measuring how much difference one unit on the ESCS scale 
(which is standardized to have an OECD mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) makes to 
student performance in math, the slopes of the socio-economic gradients can be interpreted as 
proxies for equality of opportunity for children from different family backgrounds.  
Performance levels and slopes of the socio-economic gradients are reported in Table 1. It is 
evident that there is substantial cross-state variation in both dimensions. Figure 1 plots the two 
measures against each other, and Figure A1 in the appendix provides a map of the German states 
with a rough depiction of the two measures.  
We combine the PISA data with data on socio-economic background, educational resources, 
and different institutional features of the school systems from several sources (see Table A1 in 
the appendix for sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics). Table 1 reports selected variables 
for the 16 German states, revealing substantial variation in several school policy measures.  
3.  Empirical Models  
The empirical models are straightforward, taken directly from the literature on education 
production functions. For the efficiency estimations, mean test-score performance T of students 
in state s is regressed on the institutional features I of interest and a set of control variables C:  
  s s s s C I T ε β β β + + + = 2 1 0  (1) 
In the education production function literature, it is common that the control vector include at 
least one measure each of family background and school resources (cf. Hanushek 2002).
9 Given 
the control for material inputs, estimated effects of institutions on student outcomes can be 
interpreted in terms of efficiency in such a model.  
For the equity estimations, the slope of the socio-economic gradient S, as described above, is 
similarly regressed on institutional features I and control variables C:  
  s s s s C I S η α α α + + + = 2 1 0  (2) 
where both vectors may contain different sets of variables as above. Using cross-country data, 
Schütz et al. (2005) show that this specification yields the same qualitative results as a 
                                                 
9 Cf. section III in Wößmann (2003a) and section 3.2 in Fuchs and Wößmann (2007) for extensive discussion of 
specification issues of such cross-sectional models.  
Table 1:  Descriptive state statistics of selected variables 























































Wurttemberg  512.0 44.9  1  0  3  0 29.685 0.19  1.03  85.2  31.6 0  0  4.9  25.1 3.3  7.2 
BAY  Bavaria  532.6 37.6  1  0  3  0 31.004 0.15  0.92  87.9  20.5 0  0  5.2  25.3 3.1 12.2 
BER  Berlin  488.5 41.6  0  1  3  1 23.194 0.26  1.08  73.0  26.1 1  1  5.7  25.0 2.8  4.6 
BRA Brandenburg  492.2  37.5  0  1  3  1  18.348 0.23  0.86  78.3  6.0  0  1  5.0  23.8 2.8  2.2 
BRE  Bremen  470.7 45.1  0  0  3  1 35.481 0.01  1.12  76.4  35.8 1  0  5.4  23.2 3.2  8.3 
HAM  Hamburg  480.9 41.4  0  0  3  1 44.467 0.21  1.14  77.8  34.6 1  0  6.5  24.6 2.7  7.8 
HES  Hessen  496.7 43.6  0  0  3  1 31.621 0.17  1.07  83.2  30.4 0  0  4.8  24.8 3.2  6.2 
MVO Mecklenburg-
W. Pomerania  493.2 48.3  1  0  4  0 17.777 0.07  0.91  78.7 4.7  0  1  5.0 21.6 2.8  2.3 
NIE  Lower  Saxony  494.2 44.4  0  0  3  0 22.932 0.09  0.98  82.1  24.1 0  0  4.8  23.8 3.0  6.3 
NRW North Rhine-
Westphalia  486.0 43.4  0  0  3  1 25.985 0.14  1.06  78.7  29.6 0  0  4.6  26.8 3.0  8.4 
RPF  Rhineland-
Palatinate  492.8 42.2  0  0  4  0 23.147 0.14  0.98  85.3  23.4 0  0  4.7  24.9 3.1  7.8 
SAA  Saarland  497.7 39.6  1  0  2  1 23.877 0.09  0.96  82.0  19.9 0  0  4.6  26.1 3.1  9.4 
SAC Saxony  523.2  38.8  1  0  2  0  19.260 0.20  0.87  80.7  5.9  0  1  5.4  22.9 3.2  3.6 
SAN  Saxony-
Anhalt  502.0 43.3  1  0  2  0 18.190 0.14  0.90  78.3 4.4  0  1  5.6 21.2 3.1  2.4 
SHO  Schleswig-
Holstein  496.5 46.2  0  0  3  1 23.773 0.22  0.97  83.2  17.3 0  0  4.8  23.1 3.1  3.3 
THÜ Thuringia  509.6  39.8  1  0  2  0  18.194 0.23  0.85  81.3  3.6  0  1  6.0  20.3 3.1  3.9 
Means within each state. See Table A1 for definitions and data sources.  
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Slope of the socio-economic gradient
 
Data refer to the PISA-E 2003 math test. See Table 1 for state abbreviations.  
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specification using student-level data where the effects of institutions on the slope of the socio-
economic gradient are identified by the coefficient on an interaction term between the system-
level institutional features and the student-level measure of socio-economic background that is 
used in the estimation of the socio-economic gradient.  
4.  Efficiency of Educational Production 
This section reports results of regressing mean student performance on different explanatory 
variables across German states. Results of estimating different specifications of equation (1) are 
presented in Table 2. In all specifications, the dependent variable is states’ mean performance on 
the PISA-E 2003 math test, and the sample includes all 16 German states. We start by discussing 
the effects of external exit exams, students’ socio-economic background, schools’ resource 
endowments, and the existence of comprehensive schools, respectively. We then present 
evidence on the extent to which the estimated effects of external exit exams may reflect genuine 
effects of the institutional structure or rather effects of differences in political orientations. We 
close by discussing evidence for additional factors, including private schools and the pre-school 
system, as well as evidence on whether there is an efficiency-equity tradeoff.  
The first column of Table 2 reports our basic model. When dealing with a sample of 16 
observations, parsimoniousness of the model is a virtue. Therefore, we aim to keep our models as 
small as possible, while at the same time not leaving out any variables that show independent 
significant effects. As a consequence, after some specification checks with different variables of 
socio-economic background and educational resources, the basic model includes two measures of 
family background – an index of socio-economic background (ESCS) and the employment status 
of students’ fathers – as well as a dummy on the existence of external exit exams. It turns out that 
once these three variables are included, no other available measure of family background and no 
available measure of school resources enter significantly in the model, and no additional variable 
changes the main findings on the included variables. Together, the three variables account for 83 
percent of the total cross-state variation in student performance.  
(1) External exit exams. At the time of testing, seven of the 16 German states had 
examination systems at the end of secondary school which require students to take external 
exams that are the same for all students in the state. By contrast, the other nine states had exit 
exams that were devised, conducted, and graded by individual teachers only. Economic theory 
suggests that external exit exams can function as accountability devices that change the behavior  
Table 2:  Mean student performance across German states 
    (1)    (2)   (3)     (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)     (10)      (11)     











  (3.71)   (5.36)  (5.48)  (4.79)   (4.08)   (4.53)       (4.57)   (3.82)   (5.98)   (3.67)  
Socio-economic background  81.69 









  (26.53)   (33.48)   (38.01)   (28.49)   (30.37)   (29.67)   (36.55)   (26.78)   (23.70)   (34.21)   (28.65)  








*** 0.49  1.88
** 1.88
***
  (0.50)   (1.15)   (0.57)   (0.53)   (0.62)   (0.67)   (0.74)   (0.54)   (0.67)   (0.63)   (0.49)  
C i t y   s t a t e       3 . 8 3                              
      (7.75)                                      
E a s t   G e r m a n   s t a t e       9 . 3 6                              
      (7.74)                                      
G D P   p e r   c a p i t a         0 . 0 0 2                          
          (0.46)                                  
Parental  education        6.72                          
          (14.19)                                  
M i g r a t i o n   b a c k g r o u n d            - 0 . 1 2                       
              (0.21)                              
E x p e n d i t u r e   p e r   s t u d e n t                - 0 . 8 8                    
                  (4.42)                          
C l a s s   s i z e                   0 . 2 4                   
                      (1.25)                      
I n s t r u c t i o n   t i m e                   5 . 6 2                   
                      (14.34)                      
Comprehensive  schools                     -14.01
**  - 4 . 5 0           
                          (5.44)   (4.88)              
Conservative  voters                           89.56
**      
                                  (32.53)          
Conservative  prime  minister                           2.29       
                                  (3.63)        
Private  school  enrollment                                0.27     
                                      (0.86)      
P r e - s c h o o l   e n r o l l m e n t                               - 0 . 1 6     
                                      (0.58)      
S l o p e   o f   s o c i o - e c o n o m i c                                    - 0 . 8 5  
        gradient                                          (0.63)  
Constant 320.81 
*** 237.15









  (40.34)   (92.55)   (212.12)   (41.67)   (62.93)   (49.86)   (61.09)   (44.83)   (44.65)   (63.63)   (50.95)  
N  16    16    16    16    16    16    16    16    16    16    16   
R
2    0.835   0.856   0.843  0.839  0.835  0.837   0.688  0.846  0.907  0.837  0.858  
R
2 (adj.)  0.793    0.784    0.765    0.781    0.775    0.756    0.610    0.791    0.860    0.755    0.806   
Dependent variable: student performance on PISA-E 2003 math test. Sample: all German states. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%, 
* 10%.    7
of students, parents, teachers, and principals in ways which improve students’ learning outcomes 
(cf. Bishop and Wößmann 2004; Bishop 2006).  
In line with the theory, external exit exams are statistically significantly related to better 
student performance across German states. The size of the estimated effect is substantial, at 17.9 
PISA test-score points or 17.9 percent of an international standard deviation. This compares, for 
example, with an average increase in learning over one year of age of 28.5 test-score points in the 
German PISA data.
10 As another example, the effect size can account for 38 percent of the total 
difference of 46.6 points between the best-performing and the worst-performing non-city state, 
Bavaria (which has external exit exams) and North Rhine-Westphalia (which does not).  
Figure 2 depicts the association graphically as an added-variable plot.
11 The states to the 
right, with a conditional value exceeding 0, are the ones that have external exit exams. Note that 
(conditional on socio-economic background) only one state without central exams, Berlin, 
outperforms at least one state with central exams (Baden-Wurttemberg and Saarland). With this 
exception, any state with central exams performs better than any state without central exams.  
The positive association between external exit exams and student outcomes is very robust 
and survives all the robustness specifications that we report below.
12  
(2) Socio-economic background. The basic model includes two measures of family 
background, namely the share of students whose father has full-time employment and the PISA 
index of economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS), which combines measures of parental 
occupation, education, and wealth. Both measures enter statistically significantly positive in 
predicting student performance. The finding of substantial family-background effects is in line 
with the rest of the literature on education production functions (e.g., Hanushek 2002; Schütz et 
al. 2005; Wößmann 2003a). Figure 3 depicts the associations of the two family-background 
measures with student performance graphically. Once the employment status of the students’ 
                                                 
10 This is based on the coefficient of a bivariate regression of math test score on student age (which ranges from 
15 years 2 months to 16 years 4 months) using German student-level data from the international PISA sample.  
11 Added-variable plots show the association between two variables after the influence of control variables is 
taken out. Thus, both variables are first regressed on the controls. Only the residuals of these two regressions, which 
reflect the parts of the variation in the two variables that cannot be accounted for by the controls, are used in the 
graph. This is numerically equivalent to including the controls in a multivariate regression, as in Tables 2 and 3.  
12 Cf. Jürges et al. (2005a; 2005b) for similar evidence of positive effects of external exit exams across German 
states, applying differences-in-differences and matching techniques to data on 14 German states from the 1995 Third 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the 2000 PISA-E study.   








































e( centexa | X )
coef = 17.855059, se = 3.7115602, t = 4.81
 
Added-variable plot of student performance on PISA-E 2003 math test against external exit exams, conditional on 
index of socio-economic background and employment status of father. See specification (1) in Table 2.  
 
Figure 3: Socio-economic background and student performance across German states  
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e( workfather | X )
coef = 1.9373267, se = .50072356, t = 3.87
 
Added-variable plots of student performance on PISA-E 2003 math test against index of socio-economic background 
(ESCS) and share of students with employed father, respectively, conditional on external exit exams and 
employment status of father/index of socio-economic background. See specification (1) in Table 2.  
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fathers is included, the average unemployment rate of the state does not enter significantly and 
leaves the estimate on fathers’ employment significant.
13  
Columns (2)-(4) of Table 2 report specifications that add several additional background 
measures to our basic model. First, we add two dummies for city states and for East German 
states. After controlling for the variables of the basic model, both dummies are positive, but 
statistically insignificant (individually, jointly, and when added individually). The next 
specification adds a states’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and parental education. 
Again, when added to the basic model, both additional measures of socio-economic background 
do not enter significantly (individually, jointly, or when added individually).  
In specification (4), the share of students with migration background, defined as having at 
least one parent born in a foreign country, does not enter the model significantly. The same is true 
with alternative definitions of migration background such as immigrant families (student and 
both parents born abroad), first-generation immigration (both parents born abroad, but students 
themselves not), or only one parent born abroad. Different measures of family structure, such as 
the share of students living with a single parent, in a blended family, or with both biological 
parents, also do not enter the model significantly.  
(3) Resources. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 add measures of schools’ endowments with 
resources to the basic model. The first specification uses expenditure per student in the state as an 
encompassing financial aggregate of the educational resources available. It is not statistically 
significant, and has a negative point estimate.
14 The next specification uses two measures of real 
classroom resources, namely a state’s average class size and average instruction time in math.
15 
Both measures are not statistically significant (individually, jointly, or when entered 
individually), and the point estimate on class size is counterintuitively positive. Figure 4 plots the 
conditional associations of student performance with the two most conventional resource 
measures, expenditure per student and class size. In both cases, it is clear that the lack of a 
significant association is not driven by outliers or obvious non-linearities.  
                                                 
13 Similarly, once the ESCS index is included, an alternative index of socio-economic background provided by 
PISA, the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which is based on the status of parents’ occupations and 
provides part of the information entering the construction of the ESCS index, does not enter significantly and leaves 
the ESCS index significant.  
14 The distribution of educational expenditure across states is very stable over time. Using a lagged rather than 
contemporaneous value of expenditure, e.g. for 2000, yields the same result.  
15 Note that teacher education levels do not vary across states in terms of length of study, with all states 
requiring a university teacher education to become a teacher.   
Figure 4: Resources and student performance across German states  
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e( classsize | X )
coef = .20574526, se = 1.1961106, t = .17
 
Added-variable plots of student performance on PISA-E 2003 math test against expenditure per student and class 
size, respectively, conditional on external exit exams, index of socio-economic background, and employment status 
of father. For plot (a), see specification (5) in Table 2.  
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e( private | X )
coef = 1.4245248, se = .59856821, t = 2.38
 
Added-variable plot of student performance on PISA-E 2003 reading test against private school enrollment, 
conditional on external exit exams, index of socio-economic background. and employment status of father.  
   9
Note that when measuring resources at the state level, biases from non-random placements of 
students between and within schools, which hamper conventional micro estimates (cf. Wößmann 
and West 2006), should no longer be relevant. At the same time, Fertig and Wright (2005) use the 
international PISA 2000 data to corroborate the US evidence by Hanushek et al. (1996) that the 
probability of finding significant correctly-signed class-size effects increases with the level of 
aggregation of the class-size measure. Despite this likely aggregation bias, we do not find 
significant effects of class size on student performance across German states.
16  
(4) Comprehensive schools: efficiency or selection? An obvious institutional feature that 
distinguishes German states from one another is the existence of comprehensive schools 
(Gesamtschulen). Half the states have comprehensive schools, the other half does not. The 
specific aspect of German comprehensive schools is that they do not exist instead of a selective 
system of different schools tracked by ability, but that they are rather added next to the existing 
tracks (usually Gymnasium, Realschule, and Hauptschule) in the states that introduced them. The 
PISA-E data have revealed that at the school level, comprehensive schools tend to perform much 
worse than expected, usually between the second and third track schools (Prenzel et al. 2005). 
However, from the descriptive pattern it is not clear whether the comprehensive schools indeed 
do a bad job in teaching their students, or whether it is the case that relatively poorly performing 
students tend to select themselves into the comprehensive schools. In particular, there is a feeling 
that highly ambitious parents send children whose primary-school performance suggests that they 
will not succeed in the highest-track schools to comprehensive schools, rather than to lower-track 
schools. That is, selection is likely based on student characteristics that usually go unobserved. 
While such selection would not affect states’ mean performance, a poor performance of 
comprehensive schools in teaching skills should drag down state mean performance.  
Casual observation and general public discussion seem to suggest that the latter is true: As 
specification (7) of Table 2 shows, states with comprehensive schools perform significantly 
worse, even after controlling for family background. However, to a noteworthy extent, the states 
with comprehensive schools also tend to be the states that do not have external exit exams: the 
correlation coefficient is significantly negative at -0.63. A “horse raise” specification that 
includes both comprehensive schools and external exit exams provides a clear picture which of 
                                                 
16 The lack of significant effects of resources in Germany is corroborated by time-series evidence (Gundlach et 
al. 2001) and quasi-experimental micro evidence (Wößmann 2005a).   10
the two is relevant for a state’s mean performance. As specification (8) shows, the significantly 
positive effect of external exit exams is hardly changed when the comprehensive school dummy 
is introduced, while the negative coefficient on the comprehensive school dummy gets much 
smaller (in absolute terms) and statistically insignificant once external exit exams are in the 
model. It seems that holding other relevant influences constant, states that added comprehensive 
schools to their existing tracked system perform only slightly, and not statistically significantly, 
worse than states that did not introduce the comprehensive school type.  
Similar to the comprehensive school dummy, other measures of tracking such as the age at 
which the first tracking occurs and the number of tracks do not enter significantly into the model. 
However, both measures have consistently negative coefficients, suggesting that if anything, the 
extent of tracking is negatively associated with a state’s mean student performance.  
(5) Institutions or values? In Germany, there is a clear tendency for politically conservative 
states both to have external exit exams and not to have comprehensive schools. This raises the 
question whether it is indeed the institutional feature of external exit exams which is related to 
student outcomes, or whether it is rather conservative values or governments. We obtained two 
measures of conservativeness, one referring to the specific state government, the other to the 
populace. The first measure is a dummy whether the respective state prime minister, and thus the 
main ruling party in the state, belongs to the conservative party. In 2003, this was true for nine of 
the 16 states. The correlation of conservative state government with external exit exams is 0.52, 
and -0.38 with comprehensive schools. The second measure is the share of conservative votes in 
the German federal election of September 2002. Referring to the same point in time and the same 
federal government to vote (rather than specific state governments), this measure provides a 
proxy for the political values of the population in general. The correlation of the conservative 
vote with external exit exams is 0.47, and -0.54 with comprehensive schools.  
Specification (9) of Table 2 adds both measures of conservativeness to our basic model. The 
first result is that there remains a statistically significant effect of external exit exams, only 
slightly reduced in magnitude. That is, there seems to be an effect of the institutional feature of 
external exit exams, independent of the political orientation of the government or the populace. 
The second result is that there is a significant positive association of student performance with the 
share of conservative votes in the federal election, but not with whether the respective state 
government is a conservative one or not (with or without controlling for the share of conservative 
votes). By adding the share of conservative votes, the cross-state variance in student performance   11
explained by the model increases to 91 percent (the adjusted R
2 to 0.86). While the political 
variables are entered as control variables and not necessarily for causal interpretation, it seems 
that there is something about a conservative population, rather than about a conservative 
government, which is conducive to student performance. For example, parents with conservative 
values may have a higher valuation of high-quality education in general. However, mostly 
independent of that, external exit exams exert a significant effect on student performance.
17  
(6) Private schools, pre-school system, and other additional factors. At 6 percent on 
average, the share of students attending privately managed schools in Germany is relatively small 
compared to the OECD mean. Still, the private school share varies across states from 2.2 percent 
in Brandenburg to 12.2 percent in Bavaria. Economic theory suggests that private school 
operation may increase the efficiency of a school system because market forces create incentives 
for cost effectiveness and performance-conducive qualitative innovation, both for privately 
managed schools and for nearby public schools that face their competition (cf., e.g., Shleifer 
1998; Bishop and Wößmann 2004). International evidence suggests that the share of privately 
operated schools is indeed positively related to a country’s student outcomes (Wößmann 2005b; 
cf. also Toma 2005). However, Weiß and Preuschoff (2006) have argued that such an effect may 
be less relevant in Germany, because the majority of privately operated schools are subject to 
tight public regulation which makes most of their conduct closely resemble public schools (cf. 
Toma 1996).
18 As specification (10) of Table 2 shows, the private school share is not statistically 
significantly related to a state’s mean math performance, although the point estimate is positive 
(same when entered without pre-school enrollment). But this is the only occasion where results 
differ across subjects: There is a statistically significant positive association between the share of 
students attending private schools and a state’s mean reading performance (coefficient 1.42, 
standard error 0.60) when the private school share is added to the basic model (cf. Figure 5).  
Cross-country evidence suggests that the duration of the pre-school cycle (albeit not 
necessarily pre-school enrollment) may be positively associated with student performance 
(Schütz et al. 2005). While the official duration of pre-school cycles does not vary across German 
states, pre-school enrollment does. The share of children aged 3 to 5 who are enrolled in day-care 
centers or other pre-school facilities is not significantly associated with student performance in 
                                                 
17 The comprehensive school dummy remains insignificant in the specification with the political measures. 
18 Unfortunately, there is no data available on differences in the public funding for private schools across 
German states, which proved to be important in cross-country analyses (Wößmann 2003a, 2005b).   12
our model (specification (10) of Table 2; same when entered without private school 
enrollment).
19 However, pre-school enrollment is strongly correlated with external exit exams 
across German states (correlation of 0.69). As long as external exit exams are not included in the 
model, pre-school enrollment is significantly positively associated with student performance.  
Another institutional feature that is significantly related to student outcomes in cross-country 
research is the extent of autonomy of schools in different decision-making areas (e.g., Wößmann 
2003a, 2003b). But German states are rather uniform in allowing relatively little autonomy for 
their schools, in particular in personnel matters. To the extent that there may be some differences, 
there is no comparable data available.  
The German PISA-E report provides state-level data on hours of math homework, on the 
share of students receiving private afternoon lessons and receiving other supplementary lessons, 
and on the share of students coming late to class. It also reports the share of students in a state 
whose enrollment in school was delayed by one year and who repeated a grade in primary or in 
secondary school. None of these measures enters significantly into our basic model.  
Finally, we add controls for religious affiliation to our basic model. Across the German 
states, religious affiliation may be historically associated with cultural differences and valuation 
of education. The share of Protestants, Catholics, and persons not affiliated with these two main 
religious associations in the total population, as well as the share of Protestants in the Protestant-
plus-Catholic population, all do not enter significantly. The same is true when using historical 
values on religious affiliations from the 1950s to 1980s, available for the West German states.  
(7) Efficiency-equity tradeoff? A lot of public discussion surrounds the worry that there may 
be a tradeoff between achieving efficiency and equity in educational outcomes. The descriptive 
pattern of Figure 1, however, already suggested that this hardly seems to be the case. As 
specification (11) of Table 2 shows, the slope of the socio-economic gradient, and thus the extent 
to which equity is achieved in the sense that student performance does not depend on family 
background, is not significantly related to mean performance. The point estimate is negative, 
suggesting that higher inequality is related to lower mean performance. Similarly, institutional 
measures which will be shown below to be associated with the slope of the socio-economic 
                                                 
19 The available data on pre-school enrollment refer to school year 2005/06. This is the first time that data on 
actual pre-school enrollment were collected. The only data previously available (for 2002 for the last time) are on the 
number of officially available places in day-care centers and nurseries (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004), and it is well 
known that there are huge discrepancies between states’ official numbers of slots and actually filled places.   13
gradient, namely age of first tracking and number of tracks, are unrelated to mean performance. 
Thus, the performance level does not have to be traded off against equity.  
5.  Equity of Educational Production 
This section reports results of regressing the slope of socio-economic gradient on different 
explanatory variables across German states. Results of estimating different specifications of 
equation (2) are presented in Table 3. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the slope of 
the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test of each state, which measures to what 
extent individual students’ performance depends on their socio-economic background and thus 
serves as a measure of inequality of opportunity for students from different family backgrounds. 
We start by discussing the effects of delayed tracking and the number of tracks, including the 
existence of comprehensive schools and the role of differences in political orientations. We then 
report results for several measures of students’ socio-economic background and additional 
factors, including schools’ resource endowments, the pre-school system, and private schools. We 
close again with evidence on whether there is an efficiency-equity tradeoff.  
The first column of Table 3 reports our basic equity model. It includes two measures of 
family background – GDP per capita and the standard deviation of the ESCS index of socio-
economic background – as well as two measures of the extent of tracking – the number of school 
tracks in the state and a dummy for states that track their students later than is standard. It turns 
out that once these four variables are included, no other available measure of family background 
and no available measure of school resources enter significantly in the model, and no additional 
variable changes the main findings on these variables (with the possible exception of the number 
of tracks, which sometimes drops in significance). Together, the four variables account for 67 
percent of the total cross-state variation in our measure of inequality of opportunity.  
(1) Delayed tracking. In Germany, it is standard that students are tracked, based on their 
prior performance, into different types of school after grade four (at age ten). There are two 
states, though – Berlin and Brandenburg – where the tracking takes place two years later, after 
grade six. That is, in these states all students are taught together for two more years in primary 
school.
20 While the predictions of economic theory on the effects of tracking on student outcomes 
                                                 
20 There are four additional states which have a so-called “orientation phase” in grades five and six where 
students can still decide which track is best for them. We did not find any significant difference in the efficiency or 
equity of student outcomes between these states and the states with pure early tracking.   
Table 3:  Inequality of opportunity across German states 
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2    0.669   0.821   0.671  0.724  0.707  0.809    0.713   0.714  0.837   0.676  0.690  
R
2 (adj.)  0.549    0.750    0.506    0.540    0.511    0.714    0.569    0.572    0.755    0.514    0.534   
Dependent variable: slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test. Sample: all German states; specification (13) omits one outlier (RPF). Standard 
errors in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%, 
* 10%.    14
heavily depend on the type of peer effects assumed, there is a tendency for models to find that 
later tracking is beneficial to equality of opportunity (cf., e.g., section 3 of Schütz et al. 2005). 
International evidence suggests that later tracking is indeed associated with increased equality in 
educational outcomes (Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Schütz et al. 2005).  
We find a similar effect across German states. The slope of the socio-economic gradient is 
significantly lower in states with later tracking. This effect is highly robust to the multitude of 
robustness specifications reported below. The size of the effect, with a slope of the socio-
economic gradient that is 5.1 units lower in late-tracking states, is 1.6 times as large as a standard 
deviation in the slope measure, and accounts for nearly half the slope difference of 10.8 between 
the most unequal (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and the most equal state (Brandenburg).  
As the added-variable plot of Figure 6 shows, holding the control variables constant, the two 
states with delayed tracking are both more equal than any of the other 14 German states. Of 
course, the effect is identified from two states only. But at least, it is worth noting that the results 
hold when we drop either of the two states from the sample. That is, both states strongly support 
the positive effect of later tracking on equality of opportunity.
21  
From Figures 5-7, which depict the associations of the basic model, it is apparent that 
Rhineland-Palatinate (RPF) is a noteworthy outlier to the bottom in all four dimensions. As 
specification (13) of Table 3 shows, the reported results get substantially stronger once this state 
is dropped from the sample. Note that the outlier quality of Rhineland-Palatinate is confirmed in 
robust regression techniques that drop or downweight outliers based on statistical indicators.
22 
The applied robust regression model attributes by far the lowest weight to Rhineland-Palatinate. 
Our reported results are robust to using the robust regression estimator.
23 In the remaining 
specifications, we keep including Rhineland-Palatinate in the sample, but it should be noted that 
all reported results are perfectly robust to dropping it from the sample.  
(2) Number of tracks and comprehensive schools. In addition to the age of first tracking, 
there also is variation across German states in the number of tracks, or different school types. 
                                                 
21 Bauer and Riphahn (2006) present evidence from across Swiss cantons which similarly shows that later 
tracking increases educational mobility. 
22 The specific method used, corresponding to the rreg robust estimation command in Stata, eliminates gross 
outliers for which Cook’s distance measure is greater than one (which is not the case for any observation in our 
applications), and then iteratively downweights observations with large absolute residuals. 
23 Detailed results are available from the author. Note that the efficiency specifications of Table 2 are also 
perfectly robust to using robust regression techniques. In this case, Bavaria and Saxony get downweighted. The 
results reported there are also robust to dropping these two states from the analyses altogether.  
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Added-variable plot of slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test against delayed tracking, 
conditional on standard deviation of index of socio-economic background, GDP per capita, and number of tracks. 
See specification (12) in Table 3.  
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Added-variable plot of slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test against number of tracks, 
conditional on standard deviation of index of socio-economic background, GDP per capita, and delayed tracking. See 
specification (12) in Table 3.    15
Four states have only two selective tracks, while the standard classical model (at least in West 
Germany) is to have three tracks. In addition to that, as described above, several states have 
added comprehensive schools as a quasi fourth type next to the other tracks, in effect yielding a 
total of four tracks. By increasing selectivity, the number of tracks may be viewed as an 
additional aspect of the intensity of tracking.
24 International evidence suggests that a larger 
number of school types increases inequality of opportunity (Ammermüller 2005).  
In our analysis, we measure the number of tracks in two variables, a dummy for the existence 
of comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen) and a variable on the number of the remaining school 
types. The division is undertaken in order to distinguish between effects of comprehensive 
schools, which constitute the peculiar case of a non-tracked additional school type, and the 
number of tracks in general. However, results on the number of tracks are very similar if we 
count comprehensive schools as an additional track in the number-of-tracks variable.
25  
As specification (14) of Table 3 shows, the number of tracks is significantly positively 
associated with the measure of inequality of opportunity, while the existence of comprehensive 
schools is not significantly associated with it. Each additional non-comprehensive track increases 
the slope of the socio-economic gradient by 2 units, or 64 percent of a standard deviation of the 
slope measure. Given the insignificance of the comprehensive school dummy, we have dropped it 
from our basic model specification (12), as well as from the following robustness specification. It 
should be noted that everything that follows is perfectly robust to including the comprehensive 
school dummy, which stays statistically insignificant in all the models.
26  
Figure 7 depicts the association between the number of tracks and inequality of opportunity 
graphically. Two states, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MVO) and Rhineland-Palatinate 
(RPF), appear as outliers to the right of this graph. When both are dropped from the sample, the 
                                                 
24 Using student-level data from the 2000 PISA-E study, as well as longitudinal data from two German states, 
Baumert et al. (2006) show that the type of school track is indeed associated with differential learning, even after 
controlling for a measure of basic intellectual competencies (or earlier test scores in the longitudinal data) and 
compositional effects (cf. Köller and Baumert 2001). 
25 Of course, as long as the comprehensive school dummy is included, coefficient estimates on the number-of-
tracks variable with and without counting comprehensive schools are numerically equivalent. The only difference 
between the two models is in the estimate of the comprehensive school dummy, which turns out to be statistically 
insignificant in all our models anyways. 
26 It should also be noted that a consistent definition of number of tracks is not straightforward across states. We 
have decided to use official statistics on the number of different school types which have at least five percent of the 
student population each. Other possible definitions, e.g. based on narrative accounts from the official PISA-E 
publications, also produce positive coefficient estimates, which are not always statistically significant, though.   16
results of the basic model only get stronger, with the coefficient estimate on the number of tracks 
increasing to 2.92 (standard error 1.45).  
To an extent, the number of tracks is an indicator of the extent to which students in lower-
track schools are excluded. If there are many tracks, the lowest-track school is likely to cater only 
a relatively small fraction of students, which are then separated from the core of the population, 
at the bottom. Thus, an alternative measure of the intensity of tracking would be the share of 
students attending the lowest existing track in a state. It turns out that this measure yields the 
same pattern of results when used instead of the number of tracks – the share of students in the 
lowest track is significantly associated with lower inequality of opportunity. When both are 
entered jointly, neither dominates the other, and they are jointly (but not individually) significant. 
Thus, the statistical analysis cannot distinguish between these two alternative measures, and we 
interpret them as proxying for the same underlying concept, the intensity of tracking and the 
exclusion of low-performing students that is connected with it.
27  
Specification (15) adds our two variables of political orientation. Neither the indicator of a 
conservative state government nor the share of conservative votes in the federal election enters 
significantly in the model (individually, jointly, or when entered individually). It seems that the 
effects of tracking are again true effects of the institutional structure of the school system, rather 
than proxies for the political orientation of the government or the populace.  
Finally, states differ in terms of whether the decision about which track to enter is firmly 
decided based on marks in primary school or whether parents have a lot of discretion in the 
decision. An indicator for states where marks decide on the transfer enters the model consistently 
negatively, but never statistically significantly.  
(3) Socio-economic background. Two measures of socio-economic background are included 
significantly in the basic model. The first one is the standard deviation of the PISA index of 
economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS), which was used in the construction of the socio-
economic gradients. A higher inequality in the socio-economic background of the parents is 
associated with a steeper slope of the socio-economic gradient.
28 The second measure is a state’s 
GDP per capita, which is negatively associated with the slope of the socio-economic gradient. 
                                                 
27 A third alternative measure, a dummy for whether the Hauptschule track exists in a state, has similar 
properties to the other two measures.  
28 Very similar results are obtained when the difference between the 95
th and the 5
th percentile in the ESCS is 
used instead of the standard deviation in the ESCS; the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.989.   17
That is, more economically advanced states tend to show lower inequality of opportunity. The 
two associations are depicted graphically in Figure 8.  
Specification (16) of Table 3 adds indicators for city states and for states in East Germany. 
Both are again statistically insignificant once the variables of the basic model are included. The 
same is true for the following alternative measures of socio-economic background: the ESCS 
index, the ISEI index, fathers’ employment status, the state’s unemployment rate, and indicators 
of family structure. The education level of parents tends to enter significantly positive in some 
models, but does not change any of the reported results. Different measures of migration 
background enter negatively, but statistically insignificantly, although some get close to the 
margin of standard significance levels (sometimes reaching a 15 percent level).  
(4) Resources, pre-school system, private schools, and other additional factors. A state’s 
average educational expenditure per student and instruction time do not enter significantly in the 
basic equity model.
29 Class size enters significantly negatively in the basic model (specification 
(17) of Table 3) – smaller class sizes being associated with larger inequality – but this association 
loses statistical significance once the only other significant addition to the model, the share of 
private schools (see below), is included.
30  
Pre-school enrollment of children aged 3 to 5 is negatively associated with the slope of the 
socio-economic gradient (specification (18)), but not statistically significantly at conventional 
levels (albeit at a 25% level).
31 The coefficient approaches statistical significance (at the 15% 
level) when only children aged 4 are considered. While not conclusive, such an effect would be 
in line with the international evidence of an equality-enhancing effect of extensive pre-school 
systems (Schütz et al. 2005). The somewhat weaker association in Germany might be due to the 
fact that German pre-school institutions tend to be viewed as mere day-care places which 
overlook the children, without explicit educational mandates.  
The share of students whose enrollment in school was delayed by one year is positively 
associated with inequality of opportunity (specification (19)), which may suggest that the practice 
                                                 
29 Unfortunately, no indicators are available on the variation in resources available to students with high and 
low socio-economic background.  
30 Private schools tend to be less well funded than public schools, giving rise to a positive correlation between 
class size and share of private schools.  
31 There is substantial correlation (-0.46) between pre-school enrollment and the standard deviation of socio-
economic background, and the negative coefficient on pre-school enrollment gets significant in a model that 
excludes the latter variable.  
Figure 8: Socio-economic background and inequality of opportunity across German states  
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Added-variable plot of slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test against standard deviation 
of index of socio-economic background and GDP per capita, respectively, conditional on delayed tracking, number 
of tracks, and GDP per capita/standard deviation of socio-economic background. See specification (12) in Table 3.  
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Added-variable plot of slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test against private school 
enrollment, conditional on standard deviation of index of socio-economic background, GDP per capita, delayed 
tracking, and number of tracks. See specification (20) in Table 3.    18
of late enrollment tends to hurt particularly children from low socio-economic backgrounds. 
However, the association is not statistically significant, although it gets close to statistical 
significance in some models, for example in the sample without RPF.  
The only additional factor that consistently enters the equity model significantly is the share 
of students attending privately operated schools. As reported in specification (20) of Table 3, the 
private school share is significantly negatively associated with the slope of the socio-economic 
gradient (cf. Figure 9). That is, a larger private school share is associated with more equality of 
opportunity. This finding mirrors similar international evidence, which at the same time controls 
for the share of private funding (Schütz et al. 2005). While the latter information is not 
consistently available across German states, it should be noted that most privately managed 
schools in Germany do not require private fees, but receive most of their funding from the state.
32 
A possible explanation for the finding in the German setting is that parents with low socio-
economic background may be more likely to send their children to higher-track schools if the 
schools are religious schools, which may cater better to their traditional values. In fact, most of 
the privately managed schools in Germany are run by the (Catholic or Protestant) church, and a 
majority of them are schools of the highest, academic track. These schools may make it more 
acceptable for parents who have low education themselves to send their children to high-track 
schools, where they tend to learn higher standards, while these parents may be averse to standard 
high-track schools because of their differing aspirations and because of a feeling that they cannot 
support their children at those schools. Note that including the private-school measure increases 
the variation in inequality of opportunity explained by the model to 84 percent (the adjusted R
2 to 
0.76; in the sample without RPF to 0.92 and 0.87, respectively).  
The fraction of students who repeated a grade is not significantly associated with the slope of 
the socio-economic gradient. The same is true for the share of students receiving private or other 
supplementary lessons. As currently implemented in Germany, these features do not seem to have 
first-order effects on the equality of opportunity achieved. Finally, as in the efficiency model, the 
controls for religious affiliation do not enter significantly in the basic equity model.  
(5) Efficiency-equity tradeoff? The main institutional feature significantly associated with 
mean performance, external exit exams, is not significantly related to equity (specification (21)). 
                                                 
32 The average share of public funding in privately operated schools in Germany is 77.1 percent in PISA 2000 
(Wößmann 2005b), and the remainder usually comes from church sources, but not from parental fees; unfortunately, 
this information is not available at the state level.   19
Likewise, mean performance itself does not enter the equity model significantly (specification 
(22)). Again, there is no evidence of any tradeoff between efficiency and equity.  
6.  Pooling German States with OECD Countries  
The basic patterns of the presented evidence from cross-state variation within Germany 
confirm the available cross-country evidence. For a more thorough comparison, we can test the 
consistency of the German and the international evidence within the same framework and data by 
performing the same models for the aggregate countries participating in PISA 2003. Such an 
approach does not only allow for a test whether the German results can be replicated with 
international variation, but also for statistical tests of whether results differ significantly between 
German and international variation. Table A2 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics for the 
sample of OECD countries. 
In terms of population size, it is not inappropriate to combine German states with other 
OECD countries. For example, the three biggest German states (North Rhine-Westphalia at 18 
million, Bavaria 12.5, and Baden-Wurttemberg 10.7) are each bigger than the median OECD 
country, or than such countries as Denmark (5.4), Switzerland (7.5), Austria (8.3), Sweden (9.1), 
and Belgium (10.5). Five of the 16 German states are bigger than the top performing OECD 
country in PISA, Finland (5.3). And even the smallest German state, the city state of Bremen at 
660,000, is bigger than Iceland and Luxembourg (below 500,000).  
To estimate the within-German and cross-country variation within the very same framework, 
we use the basic model specifications obtained above. First, we estimate the basic efficiency and 
equity models in the sample of 28 OECD countries (excluding Germany),
33 following studies 
such as Bishop (1997, 2006) and Lee and Barro (2001) in performing the analysis at the country 
level.
34 Next, we pool the German state and OECD country data to test for differences across the 
state and country sample. Finally, we add non-OECD countries to the model.  
(1) Efficiency. Results of running the basic efficiency model on the non-German OECD 
sample are reported in specification (23) of Table 4. Comparing this to specification (1) of Table 
2, it is obvious that the basic patterns are the same as in the sample of German states. In 
particular, external exit exams are again significantly positively related to student performance. It 
                                                 
33 Due to a low response rate, PISA 2003 data have not been reported for the United Kingdom.  
34 Ongoing research (Wößmann et al., in process) will use the international PISA 2003 data at the individual 
student level, but German confidentiality practices prevent an identification of states in the student-level data.  
Table 4:  Mean student performance across OECD countries and German states 
   (23)     (24)     (25)     (26)     (27)     (28)     (29)     (30)    









  (10.59)   (8.85)  (5.95)  (6.06)   (5.78)   (5.48)   (7.35)   (6.70)  





*** 8.87  11.68  
  (18.45)   (15.40)   (12.47)   (13.51)   (12.47)   (11.74)   (13.05)   (12.62)  









  (0.83)   (0.69)   (0.57)   (0.57)   (0.55)   (0.52)   (0.55)   (0.50)  
Private  school  enrollment               0.51
*** 0.51 
***   0.50
***
                  (0.16)   (0.15)       (0.16)  
C l a s s   s i z e             0 . 1 9              
             (0.90)                  
Germany  (dummy)     -11.30         2.51           
      (124.64)           (11.37)              
External  exit  exam  x  Germany     -4.63                    
      (13.52)                          
Socio-economic  background     53.98                    
             x Germany      (74.68)                          
Father  employed  x  Germany     -0.01                    
      (1.54)                          
Private  school  enrollment               -0.47           










  (67.60)   (56.45)   (44.95)   (49.51)   (43.66)   (41.34)   (43.95)   (39.34)  
N  28    44    44    44    42    42    54    50   
R
2    0.646    0.663  0.648  0.648  0.732  0.732   0.664  0.699  
R
2  (adj.)  0.602    0.598  0.622  0.612  0.686  0.703   0.644  0.672  
F  (Germany  and  interactions)    0.40         0.05           
Prob. > F        0.805                0.953                     
Dependent variables: student performance in the PISA-E 2003 math test. Sample: (23) OECD countries (without Germany); (24)-(28): 
pooled sample of OECD countries and German states; (29)-(30): pooled sample of OECD countries, non-OECD PISA participants, and 
German states. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%, 
* 10%.   20
may be noted that the precision of the estimate is lower in the OECD sample than in the German 
sample, suggesting that there is less noise among the more homogenous German states.  
To test whether there are any significant differences between the German state sample and 
the OECD country sample, specification (24) pools both samples and includes a dummy for 
Germany, as well as interaction terms between the German dummy and all explanatory variables. 
Neither the German dummy nor the interactions are significant, either individually or jointly (cf. 
the F-test reported at the bottom of the table). That is, the data generation process across OECD 
countries seems to be the same as the one across German states. While larger heterogeneity may 
yield less precise estimates across countries, it does not introduce any significant bias.  
As a consequence, we can estimate the model in the pooled sample of 44 data points without 
the insignificant interaction terms (specification (25)). Results are qualitatively the same as in the 
German state sample: Student performance is significantly higher in systems with external exit 
exams, with a higher index of socio-economic background, and with a larger share of employed 
fathers. Specification (26) reveals that class size is again insignificant when added to the basic 
model (also jointly with an interaction term with the German dummy if included). The same is 
true when adding educational expenditure per student.  
Across German states, the share of students attending privately operated schools was 
positively, but insignificantly related to student performance in math, although the association 
was significant in reading. When we add the private school share to the pooled model in 
specifications (27) and (28), the positive association is statistically significant also in math, and 
the size is statistically indistinguishable between the samples of German states and OECD 
countries. Thus, the lack of statistical significance in the German sample seems to stem from the 
limited statistical power due to the small number of observations.  
While the results reported so far refer to the relatively homogenous sample of economically 
advanced OECD member states only, several non-OECD countries participated in PISA 2003. As 
specifications (29) and (30) reveal, our substantive results are robust to including the non-OECD 
countries with available data in the analysis, which increases the sample to up to 54 data points. 
Interaction terms with a German dummy are again insignificant.  
As in the German state sample, the indicator of late tracking, the number of tracks, and  the 
slope of the socio-economic gradient again enter insignificantly in the pooled sample.  
(2) Equity. Results of running the basic equity model on the non-German OECD sample are 
reported in specification (31) of Table 5. Inequality of opportunity is again negatively associated  
Table 5:  Inequality of opportunity across OECD countries and German states 
   (31)     (32)     (33)     (34)     (35)     (36)    







  (3.96)   (3.31)   (2.29)   (2.34)   (2.57)   (2.45)  




* 1.34      
  (1.03)   (0.86)   (0.76)   (0.78)   (0.82)      







             economic background  (11.05)   (9.24)   (8.52)   (7.38)   (11.63)   (8.53)  
GDP  per  capita  -0.01    -0.01   -0.10         0.22 
* 
  (0.19)   (0.16)   (0.13)           (0.12)  
Private  school  enrollment          0.06   0.07     
              (0.05)   (0.05)      






      (20.51)   (18.65)   (15.04)   (16.03)   (21.47)  
Delayed tracking x Germany      0.78
[g]            
      (5.23)                  
Number of tracks x Germany      0.22
[g]            
      (2.38)                  






     nomic background x Germany      (26.54)   (19.73)   (16.33)   (17.64)   (27.25)  
GDP per capita x Germany      -0.39
[g]          - 0 . 7 9  
**
      (0.36)               (0.37)  
Private  school  enrollment          -0.90
* -0.86      
             x Germany              (0.49)   (0.51)      
External  exit  exam              -0.12
[g]  
                  (2.01)      
Mean  performance              -0.01
[g]  








  (12.58)   (10.51)   (9.69)   (6.94)   (28.70)   (9.08)  
N  26    42    42    42    42    47   
R
2    0.496   0.513  0.494  0.551  0.553  0.514   
R
2  (adj.)  0.399   0.376  0.407  0.459  0.427  0.441   
F (Germany and interactions)      1.47   3.22   3.23   2.95   3.10  
Prob. > F     0.226  0.052  0.034  0.048  0.037   
F  (variables  in  [g])  4.27    0.42         0.07     
Prob. > F  0.028    0.742                0.932         
Dependent variables: slope of the socio-economic gradient in the PISA-E 2003 math test. Sample: (31) OECD 
countries (without Germany); (32)-(35): pooled sample of OECD countries and German states; (36): pooled 
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with the indicator of delayed tracking, and positively with the number of tracks. Both estimates 
are individually statistically significant at the 15 percent level only, but jointly at the 5 percent 
level (see the F-test of joint significance of the group of coefficients indicated by [g], reported at 
the bottom of the table). When pooling the German and the OECD sample (specification (32)), 
the German dummy and the interactions are not jointly statistically significant. However, the 
German dummy and its interaction with the standard deviation of the index of socio-economic 
background are individually significant, while the other interactions are far from statistical 
significance individually and jointly. Thus, specification (33) includes only the former two, 
which are now jointly significant at the 10 percent level.  
The main finding of this basic pooled specification is that equality of opportunity is higher in 
systems with later tracking and with fewer tracks, and that these effects are not significantly 
different between the German state sample and the OECD country sample. Furthermore, while 
inequality of opportunity is significantly lower the larger the dispersion of socio-economic 
background across OECD countries, the opposite is true across German states. Controlling for 
this significant interaction, the dummy for Germany is significantly negative (it is not in a model 
without the interaction term). Finally, in the pooled model GDP per capita is no longer 
significant. While the difference in associations with indicators of socio-economic background is 
noteworthy, they are included and interpreted as control variables only in our models.  
An indicator for German-type Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools) remains statistically 
insignificant in the pooled regression. The qualitative result on the number of tracks is not 
affected by whether Gesamtschulen are counted as a separate track in the number of tracks or not.  
The variation in the delay of tracking across OECD countries goes beyond the dichotomous 
German variation of whether students are tracked before age 12 or not. When using the age of 
first tracking as an alternative, continuous measure of the time of tracking, results are similar. 
However, when the delayed-tracking dummy is included in a “horse race” specification together 
with the continuous age-of-tracking variable, the dummy dominates.  
As shown by specification (34), the negative association between private school enrollment 
and inequality of opportunity is specific to the German sample and does not show up in the 
OECD sample. This result is not affected by including the average share of public funding in the 
cross-country specification. The German-specific result may reflect the German-specific 
explanation suggested above that religious schools may attract students with low socio-economic 
background into high-track schools.    22
Specification (35) shows that neither mean performance nor external exit exams enter the 
equity model significantly, either individually or jointly. As in the German sample, the pooled 
sample does not reveal any signs of efficiency-equity tradeoff. Finally, specification (36) adds 
non-OECD countries with available data to the model. Unfortunately, only data on the age of first 
tracking, but not on the number of tracks are available for them. The result on delayed tracking is 
robust in the expanded sample, and in this sample it is even stronger when delayed tracking is 
measured continuously by the age of first tracking.  
In sum, the main fundamental institutional determinants of interest in our models – external 
exit exams and private school shares in the efficiency model and delayed tracking and the number 
of tracks in the equity model – are similarly significant across OECD countries as they are across 
German states. Even more, their point estimates do not differ significantly between the two 
samples. The only exception of a significant difference is the share of private schools in the 
equity model, which is significant in the German model but not in the OECD model.  
7. Conclusions 
There is substantial variation in the level and inequality of student performance and in the 
institutional structures of the school systems across German states. The evidence provided in this 
paper shows that there are significant and robust associations between the institutional features 
and the efficiency and equity of educational outcomes. The existence of external exit exam 
systems is systematically related to higher student performance. Given that this result holds when 
controlling for resource inputs, it can be interpreted as an association between external exit exams 
and the efficiency of educational production. At least in reading, the share of privately operated 
schools is also positively associated with student performance.  
Early tracking and the intensity of tracking (measured by the number of school tracks or the 
share of students attending the lowest-track school type) are both systematically related to a 
stronger dependence of students’ performance on their socio-economic background. Thus, there 
is a significant and robust association between delayed, less intensive tracking and greater 
equality of opportunity. There also is a positive association between the share of privately 
operated schools and equality of opportunity in Germany. Although only at the verge of statistical 
significance, the same is true for larger pre-school enrollment. Also in line with the cross-country 
evidence, socio-economic background is strongly associated with student outcomes across 
German states, while the resource endowment of schools is not.    23
In terms of all three institutional determinants of school efficiency and equity – central 
exams, tracking, and private schools – the German evidence confirms existing cross-country 
evidence. When estimating the same models with the same PISA 2003 data on the sample of 
OECD countries, we find the same results (with the exception of private schools in the equity 
model): Countries with external exit exams and larger shares of privately operated schools have 
higher student performance, and countries with later tracking and fewer number of school tracks 
have higher equality of opportunity. What is more, the size of each of these institutional effects is 
statistically indistinguishable between the German state sample and the aggregate country sample 
in a pooled estimation of up to 54 observations. In a statistical sense, there is no difference in the 
fundamental determinants of the efficiency and equity of learning outcomes between the cross-
state variation in Germany and the international variation across countries, providing additional 
validity to the results from across the 16 German states. In this sense, educational production in 
the German states provides a microcosm for the OECD countries.  
Additional specifications of the German sample show that it is the institutional features of 
the school systems themselves, rather than the political orientation of the government or the 
populace with which some of them are correlated, which give rise to the association with student 
outcomes. There also is some association between political orientation and student outcomes 
independent of schooling institutions, but it is that mean performance tends to be higher in states 
with a larger population with conservative values, rather than with a conservative government.  
The mere existence of comprehensive schools, which have been added next to the existing 
school tracks in some German states, is not significantly associated with either the efficiency or 
equity of student outcomes across the states.  
Finally, there are no signs of efficiency-equity tradeoffs in educational production, either in 
the German or the international sample. There is no significant association between the 
performance level and the slope of the socio-economic gradient, and if anything, lower inequality 
is found in states with higher mean performance. There are also no cross effects of the main 
institutional features: central exams are associated with efficiency, but not with equity, while 
tracking is associated with equity, but not with efficiency. The only exception is private school 
operation, which is positively associated with both efficiency and equity (the latter at least in 
Germany). This again suggests that if anything, there is a complementarity rather than a tradeoff 
between achieving efficiency and equity in education.    24
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Figure A1: The German states 
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Data refer to the PISA-E 2003 math test. See Table 1 for state abbreviations.  
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Table A1:  Schooling data across German states: Definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics  
Variable Definition  Source  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Mean performance  Mean performance of students on the PISA-E 2003 math test  Prenzel et al. (2005)  498.0  15.4  470.7  532.6 
Slope of socio-economic 
gradient 
Slope of the socio-economic gradient (estimated coefficient of a 
regression of individual student performance on ESCS)  
Prenzel et al. (2005)  42.3  3.1  37.5  48.3 
External exit exam   External exit exam (dummy)   KMK (2005)  0.44  0.51  0  1 
Delayed tracking  Late tracking (dummy equaling 1 if tracking after grade 6 and 0 
if tracking after grade 4)  
KMK (2006)  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Number of tracks  Number of tracks (no. of different types of schools with at least 5 
percent of the student population each), not counting the 
comprehensive schools (captured by next variable) 
Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2006a) 
2.88 0.62  2  4 
Comprehensive schools  State has integrated comprehensive school type (dummy)  Prenzel et al. (2005)  0.50  0.52  0  1 
GDP per capita  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 2003, in 1,000 Euro  Statistische Ämter der 
Länder (2006) 
25.433 7.414 17.777  44.467 
Socio-economic background  PISA index of economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS)  Prenzel et al. (2005)  0.16  0.07  0.01  0.26 
Standard deviation of socio-
economic background 
Standard deviation of ESCS  Prenzel et al. (2005)  0.98  0.09  0.85  1.14 
Father employed  Share of students whose father has full-time employment  Prenzel et al. (2005)  80.76  3.79  73.0  87.9 
Parental education  Longest education of either father or mother, in years  Prenzel et al. (2005)  13.42  0.32  13.0  13.9 
Migration background  Share of students with migration background (at least one parent 
born in a foreign country)  
Prenzel et al. (2005)  19.87  11.58  3.6  35.8 
City state  State is a city state (dummy)     0.19  0.40  0  1 
East German state  State is in east Germany (dummy)     0.38  0.50  0  1 
Expenditure per student  Expenditure on public schools per student, 2003, in 1,000 Euro  Stat. Bundesamt (2006b)  5.19  0.54  4.600  6.500 
Class size  Average class size in lower secondary education, 2004  Stat. Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder (2006) 
23.91 1.79  20.3  26.8 
Instruction time  Instruction time in math, in hours per week  Prenzel et al. (2005)  3.04  0.17  2.7  3.3 
Delayed enrollment  Share of students whose enrollment was delayed  Prenzel et al. (2005)  13.11  3.50  8.0  19.5 
Repeaters  Share of students who repeated at least one grade during lower 
secondary education 
Prenzel et al. (2005)  14.66  4.29  7.4  24.7 
Pre-school enrollment  Share of children aged 3 to 5 who attend day-care centers or 
other pre-school facilities, 2005/06  
Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2007) 
90.03 5.34  79.7  98.5 
Private school enrollment  Share of students attending private schools in lower secondary 
education, 2004  
Stat. Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder (2006) 
5.99 2.94  2.2  12.2 
Conservative voters  Share of votes for CDU/CSU party in total votes for CDU/CSU 
and SPD in federal Bundestag election of 22.9.2002 
Bundeswahlleiter (2002)  0.45  0.08  0.321  0.669 
Conservative prime minister  Prime minister of state is from CDU/CSU party in May 2003    0.56  0.51  0  1 
Religious affiliation  Share of Protestant (and Catholic) church members in the 
population, 2003 
Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland (2004) 
30.60 12.48  15.9  56.9 
Transfer by marks  Marks (grades) rather than parents decide on which track a 
student can go to (dummy)  
Demmer (2004)  0.44  0.51  0  1 
  
Table A2:  Schooling data across OECD countries: Definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics  
Variable Definition  Source  Obs.  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Mean performance  Mean performance of students on the PISA 2003 math test  OECD (2004)  28  499.5  36.6  385  544 
Slope of socio-economic 
gradient 
Slope of the socio-economic gradient (estimated 
coefficient of a regression of individual student 
performance on ESCS)  
OECD (2004)  28  41.5  7.5  28  55 
External exit exam   External exit exam (dummy)   Bishop (2006), Fuchs 
and Wößmann (2007), 
among others 
28 0.658 0.464  0  1 
Delayed tracking  Late tracking (dummy equaling 1 if tracking not earlier 
than age 12)  
OECD (2004)  28  0.821  0.390  0  1 
Age of first tracking  First age of selection in the education system  OECD (2004)  28  14.0  2.0  10  16 
Number of tracks  Number of school types or distinct educational programs 
available to 15-year-olds  
OECD (2004)  27  2.556  1.396  1  5 
GDP per capita  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 2003, in 1,000 
equivalent US dollars using purchasing power parity  
OECD (2004)  27  22.972  8.211  6.046  36.587 
Socio-economic 
background 
PISA index of economic, social, and cultural status 
(ESCS) 
OECD  (2004)  28 -0.008 0.401  -1.13 0.69 
Standard deviation of socio-
economic background 
Standard deviation of ESCS  OECD (2004)  28  0.914  0.127  0.73  1.27 
Father employed  Share of students whose father has full-time employment  PISA student 
compendium
a 
28 78.5  8.5  51.19  90.82 
Expenditure per student  Cumulative expenditure per student between 6 and 15 
years, 2003, in equivalent US dollars using purchasing 
power parity 
OECD  (2004)  25 52.690 20.271 14.874  79.716 
Class size  Average number of students attending math class, reported 
by PISA 2003 students  
OECD (2004)  28  23.4  4.4  17.7  36.1 
Private school enrollment  Average share of students attending schools managed 
directly or indirectly by a non-government organization 




26 18.0  22.3  0.45  74.46 
a Student and school compendia provided by PISA 2003 at http://pisaweb.acer.edu.au/oecd_2003/oecd_pisa_data_s1.html.  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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